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ESSAY
FREE EXERCISE AND THE RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
DOUGLAS LA YCOCK*
I want to do two things today, one in my academic hat and one in a
more practical hat. I want to give you two frameworks or models into
which some current events in the free exercise area can be fitted, and then
I want to review some recent cases and pending legislation in light of
those models.
I. Two MODELS OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT
A. Post-Reformation Conflict
The nature of conflict over religious liberty has changed, in ways that
some of the churches recognized first, and that legal scholars, including
myself, have been much slower to recognize. What is the problem to be
solved by religious liberty, or, to put it another way, what does religious
persecution consist of? For almost 500 years, the answer to that question
has been based on the model of conflict in the wake of the Reformation.
In the wake of the Reformation, for almost 200 years, European Chris-
tians killed each other over differences in faith. Obviously, that was a
serious problem. Religious liberty was supposed to solve that problem:
to end the problem in Europe and to make sure that it would never hap-
pen here.
The problem of the Reformation has not entirely gone away. Some of
the cases I will talk about today are problems of mainstream religious
groups exhibiting great hostility to decidedly non-mainstream minority
religious groups. Different religious groups are not killing each other, at
least in this country, and the range of groups that is accepted or at least
tolerated has expanded considerably. But there remains a residue of re-
ligiously motivated hostility and discrimination against religious minori-
ties that are too different or too threatening to the majority.
But these Reformation-style conflicts have largely been superseded.
* Editor's Note: Douglas Laycock is the Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in
Law and Associate Dean for Research at The University of Texas Law School. He is the
author of Modem American Remedies: Cases and Materials (1985). The Death of the
Irreparable Injury Rule (1991), and numerous articles. Professor Laycock also argued
the animal sacrifice case, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct.
2217 (1993), before the United States Supreme Court, prevailing in a unanimous decision
in favor of the Church's free-exercise rights. These remarks, sponsored by the Fordham
Christian Legal Society, were delivered at Fordham Law School on October 27, 1993.
They have been lightly edited, and footnotes have been added, but they retain the form
and style of the oral remarks.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Differences among religions are no longer the most important source of
conflict over religious liberty.
B. Conflict Between Religious and Secular Interests
The most important religious conflict in the United States is not the
conflict of one religion against another, but of the secular against the
religious. On one side are all those people who take religion quite seri-
ously, for whom religion still makes a substantial difference in their lives.
On the other side are all those people who do not take religion seriously,
who cannot imagine why these superstitions persist, and who cannot un-
derstand why religious minorities are demanding special treatment from
the secular administrative state.
This secular-religious conflict has become enormously more important
for two reasons. One is simply the sheer growth of the state. In 1789,
protecting churches from government regulation wasn't much of a prob-
lem because there wasn't much government regulation. Today, it is an
enormous problem, because society is pervasively regulated.
Second, the secular-religious conflict has become a problem because
today there are large groups of non-believers, many of whom are quite
indifferent to religion, and some of whom are quite hostile to religion.
There are interest groups with important and admirable causes that
sometimes come into conflict with traditional religions, and who are no
longer inclined to give much deference to religious traditions that get in
their way. So we have lobbying fights between civil rights organizations
or environmental organizations or gay rights organizations or animal
rights organizations on one side and some traditional religion on the
other.
Some of these interest-group conflicts can be assimilated to the post-
Reformation model-indeed, I think this is a good way to look at it. All
the people who don't take religion very seriously simply have a new an-
swer to the traditional questions. Religion is an answer to questions
about God, about whether there is a God, about whether there is any-
thing after death. A negative answer to those questions is as much a
religion for constitutional purposes as an affirmative answer. That is why
the state can neither establish nor prohibit atheism. Widespread accept-
ance of negative answers to religious questions leads to new conflicts be-
tween people who give those answers and people who give other, more
traditional answers, just as the emergence of Protestantism in the Refor-
mation led to new conflicts with Catholicism. These new conflicts be-
tween affirmative and negative views of religion are religious conflicts.
Once we realize that, at least those conflicts fit into the traditional model,
and we can go about our business.
The people on the secular side certainly don't view it that way. They
think that their views are not religious, and they mostly think that they
are the solution to religious conflict and not part of the problem. They
will resist assimilation to the Reformation model.
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Moreover, even if I could assimilate the secularists to the Reformation
model, that is only part of the new threat to religious liberty. There is
also the conflict between religions collectively on the one hand and insen-
sitive government regulation on the other. Imperious bureaucrats may
have the fervor of a religion, but they are not answering religious ques-
tions. The conflict between religions and the regulatory state plainly can-
not be fitted into the Reformation model. New models or new ways of
thinking about religious-liberty problems have to be developed.
This historical shift in the nature of the problem is related to the theo-
retical and doctrinal debate that is going on in the Supreme Court and in
the halls of Congress about exactly what we mean by the "free exercise of
religion."
II. THE MEANING OF FREE EXERCISE
A. Equality Rights
There are currently in play two fundamentally different, inconsistent
ways of defining religious liberty or government neutrality towards reli-
gion. One, most prominently associated with Justice Scalia, is that reli-
gious liberty is an equality right. Religious liberty consists of not being
discriminated against: the law that applies to any religious minority will
be the same as the law that applies to anybody else, and as long as that
criterion is satisfied, religious liberty is fully protected.
So if it is the law that Catholics can't serve Mass on Sunday, as they
couldn't in Ireland for 300 years, that law violates religious liberty be-
cause it is a law that singles out Catholics. But if it is the law that no-
body can discriminate on the basis of sex in employment, and some
aggressive litigator decides to challenge the exclusion of women from the
Catholic priesthood, that lawsuit is not a problem of religious liberty. It
is simply the application of a neutral, generally applicable law to a reli-
gious group that is violating the law, and who are these religious people
to say that they are entitled to special treatment?
That's Scalia's version, and he got five votes for it in a case called
Employment Division v. Smith' in 1990, which most of you know as the
peyote case.
B. Liberty Rights
The other version is that the exercise of religion is not merely an equal-
ity right, not merely a right to non-discrimination, but that it is a liberty
right. It is a substantive right not to be regulated with respect to certain
matters that are very important to the individual. More precisely, be-
cause no right is absolute in our society, it is a right presumptively not to
be regulated: the state should not burden a religious practice without a
compelling reason. That was the rule that prevailed in the Supreme
1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
1994]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Court from Sherbert v. Verner2 in 1963 until just before the Smith case in
1990.
The substantive view of religious liberty, the right to be let alone, says
equality is not enough, non-discrimination is not enough. Rather, reli-
gious liberty protects both individuals and religious organizations from
some of the regulation that is now imposed by the secular state. A reli-
gious minority, therefore, can be an enclave where different traditions
can prevail, subject to the compelling government interest test. The com-
pelling interest test allows government to regulate for sufficiently strong
reasons, principally to prevent tangible harm to third persons who have
not joined the faith. Because non-discrimination doesn't provide that en-
clave for free exercise, substantive exemptions are required. That is the
core of the debate.
III. RECENT EXAMPLES
A. Government Attempts to Prevent Worship Services
The Supreme Court has been committed in recent years to the view
that religious liberty consists merely of non-discrimination. The Smith
case is the most important and the best known example. For those of
you who don't know about it, let me tell you just a little bit.
Smith was one of three cases in the last three years in which very
small, non-traditional, non-Western religious minorities were brought to
the very brink of being outlawed religions in the classic sense. Their cen-
tral religious rituals were about to become illegal or impossible in the
United States of America. Now, as it happens, all three of them ducked
the bullet. They ducked it by narrow margins and through a lot of work
by many people around the country. But all three of these religions came
very, very close.
The first was the religion involved in the Oregon peyote case, Employ-
ment Division v. Smith.3 This case sounds like it was made up by a law
professor for a final exam, but it is actually a real case. Smith had a
friend named Black. One of them was an American Indian; one was not.
Smith and Black wanted to go to a peyote service and see what it was
like.
The peyote religion is bona fide. It was found being practiced in the
Southwest by the first Spanish explorers, as described in the very earliest
written records, in substantially the same way that it exists now. It uses
peyote in intoxicating quantities in an all-night ceremony. Participants
are required to sober up before they leave in the morning. The faithful
believe that they directly experience the presence of God in peyote
intoxication.
Peyote is not an important recreational drug; it never has been so and
2. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
3. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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it is not likely to become so. Peyote occurs naturally in certain cacti in
the desert Southwest. You can get a license from the federal government
to grow it for religious use. In far south Texas there are government-
licensed peyote farmers. You take peyote by eating the cactus buds,
which I understand-this is not first-hand reporting-are very difficult to
get down. Lots of people get sick when they try to take them. But if you
persist you can directly experience the presence of God, if you believe in
this religion. So there is a payoff at the end, but it is not a recreational
payoff.
This religion exists from northern Mexico to Alberta. It operates le-
gally under the federal regulatory exemption and under state exemptions
in many states-some sources say twenty-three states, others say twelve
states; there is some argument about what it means to incorporate federal
law in this area.4 Oregon was not one of these states with an exemption,
but no one had been prosecuting worshipers.
Smith and Black had the misfortune that they worked as drug counsel-
ors in a rehabilitation clinic that had an absolute no-tolerance rule for its
employees. Their supervisor testified at one point that if they had gone
to Catholic Mass and taken wine, he would have fired them for that too.'
I don't believe him, but that's what he said, trying to show that there was
no discrimination or hostile motive at work.
Smith and Black were fired, and they filed for unemployment compen-
sation. The case came to the Supreme Court twice. The first time, the
Court said it wanted to treat the case as though it were a criminal prose-
cution, even though it wasn't. The Court said it wanted to decide
whether Oregon could criminally prosecute these people.' This came
from five justices who like to complain about what's wrong with judicial
activism and say that judges should decide only the narrow case before
them.
When the case came back, it was argued entirely in terms of whether
the war on drugs gave Oregon a compelling interest in the no-exceptions
rule. No one suggested there might be a question about the compelling
interest test. But Justice Scalia wrote an opinion for five justices, which
said Oregon didn't have to satisfy the compelling interest test. Oregon
didn't have to satisfy a substantial basis test. Oregon didn't even have to
satisfy a rational basis test. As I read the opinion, it says that if the law
itself is rational-if it's rational to ban peyote in Oregon-then Oregon
need have no reason whatever for refusing to carve out a religious exemp-
4. See Reply Brief for Petitioners, Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v.
Smith at n.8, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (No. 88-1213), available in LEXIS, Gen. Fed. USPLUS
Library (eleven or twelve states); Brief for Respondents, Employment Div., Dep't of
Human Resources v. Smith text accompanying notes 16-17, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (No. 88-
1213), available in LEXIS, Gen. Fed. USPLUS library (twenty-three states).
5. See Black v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 721 P.2d 451, 452
(Or. 1986), vacated, 485 U.S. 660 (1988).




tion. Refusing a religious exemption is simply not a constitutional issue.'
Now, the civil liberties optimist reading this says something like: "Oh,
it's a drug case. Drugs are special. We know the Court is crazy about
drugs. And that's all it means." But if that were all it meant, Justice
O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion that would have solved the prob-
lem-it's a drug case, there's a compelling interest, and no exceptions for
drugs.'
The other way to look at Smith is that it was a worship-service case.
The peyote ritual was the central worship service of this religion. The
Supreme Court said it can be criminalized, and that criminalizing a wor-
ship service raises no issue to be decided under the free exercise of reli-
gion clause. Once the Court decides the law is neutral and generally
applicable, there is simply no issue left. That was Smith.
Why did I say that the peyote religion came only to the brink of being
outlawed? Because there was such a political outcry in Oregon that Ore-
gon passed an exemption. After having made this bad doctrine for the
rest of the country, Oregon then exempted everyone except prisoners
from the ban on the peyote religion.9
The second case involved the Hare Krishnas. ° The Hare Krishnas
are not the favorite group of lots of people. I will tell you, however, that
they are accepted as a legitimate branch of Hinduism by every major
Hindu organization and religious authority, so far as I'm aware. The
legal threat to the Hare Krishnas in the United States got front page
coverage in newspapers in India.
The Hare Krishnas were sued in state court in California by the par-
ents of one of their members, who had been under age when she joined
them. The parents alleged that the Hare Krishnas had falsely impris-
oned their daughter by persuading her to believe in their religion. It later
came out that the parents had chained their daughter to the toilet to keep
her from going to Hare Krishna meetings. No one sued over false im-
prisonment on that.
The parents' complaint had multiple counts. The Hare Krishnas, they
said, had persuaded their daughter by teaching her things. Then, at the
daughter's request, they concealed her location from her parents. That
counted as false imprisonment. There was also a defamation count, an
emotional distress count, and a wrongful death count-the Hare
Krishnas were alleged to have caused her father's second heart attack.
The jury brought in a total of $32 million in compensatory and puni-
7. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith 494 U.S. 872, 876-90
(1990).
8. See id. at 903-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
9. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 475.992(5), (6) (Supp. 1992).
10. See George v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 262 Cal. Rptr. 217
(Cal. Ct. App.), review denied and ordered not published 1989 Cal. Lexis 5077 (Cal. Nov.
30, 1989), vacated, 499 U.S. 914 (1991).
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tive damages on these various counts. t1 The trial judge reduced it to
about $10 million, and the state appellate court reduced it to about $6
million.'2 The state supreme court denied review.' 3
The trial judge appointed a receiver to take possession of all the tem-
ples, all the places of worship, and all the ashrams or monasteries in
California. Then the plaintiffs went on to file lis pendens-notifications
that the property was in litigation--on all the temples and monasteries
elsewhere in the country. All of this property would have had to be sold
to pay the judgment. So in the same way that the Romans destroyed the
Temple in Jerusalem and that Henry VIII seized the monasteries in Eng-
land, all the places of worship of the Hare Krishnas in the country were
going to be seized to pay this single judgment.
After the state supreme court denied review, the trial judge ordered
the receiver to start selling the property. That was probably a tactical
mistake. Michael McConnell, of the University of Chicago, represented
the Hare Krishnas and got a chance to file an extra set of papers on a
motion for an emergency stay of the sale.
The motion went to Justice O'Connor, who is the Circuit Justice for
the Ninth Circuit. Those of you in a remedies course know that Justice
O'Connor thinks that punitive damages are unconstitutional and widely
abused.' So she was the right Justice to go to. She stayed the sale of the
temples and the monasteries for reasons having nothing whatever to do
with the First Amendment, so far as I can tell.
Then McConnell filed a petition for certiorari, and in March, the case
was vacated and remanded 5 for further consideration in light of Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,'6 a case about punitive damages
against an insurance company. Again, this had nothing to do with the
First Amendment, except that it followed the logic of the equal-treat-
ment view of religious liberty: the Hare Krishnas had to be treated as
well as an insurance company. On remand, the case eventually settled
for an amount they could afford to pay, and so the Hare Krishnas
ducked the bullet.
The third case is the one that I argued, Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,7 involving animal sacrifice in south Florida.
11. See George, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
12. See id.
13. See George v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness. 1989 Cal. Lexis
5077 (Cal. Nov. 30, 1989), vacated, 499 U.S. 914 (1991).
14. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2728-42
(1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42-64
(1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal. Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 282-301 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part); Bankers Life & Casualty
Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 86-89 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
15. See George v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 499 U.S. 914
(1991).
16. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
17. 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
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The religion is Santeria. It originated in West Africa several thousand
years ago. It came to the Caribbean with slavery, where slaveowners
tried to suppress it. African religion in the United States was totally
suppressed under slavery. The Caribbean slave owners were less diligent,
or the Caribbean slaves were more clever-I'm not sure which-but,
anyhow, African religion survived in much of the Caribbean. It survived
in part by taking on the trappings of Catholicism, and thus it evolved in
different ways on different islands. The Cuban variant is called Santeria
because it has absorbed many of the Catholic saints, and each African
god is now identified with a particular Catholic saint.
Santeria came to the United States mostly with the refugees who fled
from Castro. I don't think anybody knows, but the trial court found that
50,000 to 60,000 practitioners of Santeria live in south Florida.1
8
Santeria practitioners sacrifice chickens and goats in the rituals associ-
ated with major life events: birth, death, marriage, sickness, and espe-
cially the initiation of new priests.19
Santeria has continued to practice underground. It is still mostly a
religion of poor people, mostly black Cubans, although neither of those
generalizations is entirely true. There are white Santeria, and there are
middle-class and professional Santeria. There are people who are both
Catholic and Santeria, or at least attend services in both faiths. The reli-
gion has been unpopular in south Florida, but before this case there had
been no active efforts to suppress it.
The people I represented came to believe that their family was called
to take Santeria public, to institutionalize it, to create a church: there
would be a Santeria church on the corner like the Methodist church or
the Catholic church on the corner. When they acquired property in Hi-
aleah and announced that the church would open, the city responded
with four ordinances that were designed to ban animal sacrifice anywhere
in the city and to do so without affecting any other killing of an animal in
the city for any reason.
Florida is not a big animal-rights state. Hunting is a constitutionally
protected activity in Florida. There is a state supreme court decision
that if they interfere with your deer lease they've got to pay you compen-
sation.20 It is a crime in Florida to help an animal escape from a
hunter.2' The state runs camps that teach junior high school kids how to
hunt. But Hialeah was suddenly very concerned about the killing of ani-
mals in religious ceremonies.
The ordinances were written in religious terms. They made it unlaw-
18. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp.
1467, 1470 (S.D. Fla. 1989), affd, 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2217
(1993).
19. See id. at 1470-71.
20. See Alford v. Finch, 155 So. 2d 790, 793 (Fla. 1963).
21. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 372.705 (West Supp. 1993).
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ful "to sacrifice."22 "Sacrifice" was defined as "to unnecessarily kill...
an animal in a ... ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food
consumption."23 So if you skipped the ritual it would be okay. You
could kill your dog for no reason in the back yard, and you would not
violate Ordinance 87-52 or 87-71. An "unnecessary" killing would vio-
late Ordinance 87-40 even without a ritual, but in the context of sur-
rounding Florida law and local practice, killing a surplus pet because you
no longer wished to care for it would be a necessary killing, and therefore
entirely legal. Florida law, incorporated into Ordinance 87-40, expressly
authorized property owners to put poison in their yard to kill any animal
that wanders by.24 Even a killing in a ritual would not violate Ordinance
87-52 or 87-71 if the ritual were not the primary purpose. The City's
position at trial was that this clause protected kosher slaughter, because
in kosher slaughter the City thought that food consumption is primary
and religion is secondary. But in Santeria the City thought the priorities
were reversed, even though nearly all the animals are eaten in a ritual
feast following the sacrifice.
Finally, to prove a violation of Ordinance 87-40, 87-52, or 87-71, the
City had to prove that the killing was "unnecessary." 25 An opinion from
the State Attorney General said animal sacrifice is "unnecessary." If you
know that Santeria is a false religion, then you know that Santeria sacri-
fices are unnecessary. The Attorney General either thought he knew
that, or more likely, he gave the issue no serious thought. If Santeria is a
true religion, then Santeria sacrifice is absolutely necessary. And if any-
thing is clear it is that the state cannot decide whether Santeria is a true
or false religion. Every prosecution under the ordinance would be a her-
esy trial.
The fourth ordinance, 87-72, made it unlawful to kill an animal for
food purposes except in a place zoned for a slaughterhouse.2 6 But there
was an exception for the small scale slaughter of hogs and cattle!2" The
City conceded that it had not meant to prohibit the boiling of live lob-
sters. The Court viewed Ordinance 87-72 as simply part of the package
designed to suppress Santeria.28
The case was tried before I got involved in it by three volunteer law-
yers for the ACLU. It was tried before Smith, under the compelling in-
22. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217,
2236-38 (1993) (reprinting City of Hialeah, Fla. Ordinance No. 87-52 (September 8,
1987), City of Hialeah, Fla. Ordinance No. 87-71 (Sept. 22, 1987)).
23. Id. at 2236 (reprinting City of Hialeah, Fla. Ordinance 87-52 (Sept. 8, 1987)).
24. See id. (reprinting City of Hialeah, Fla. Ordinance 87-40 (June 9, 1987)), Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 828.08 (West 1976).
25. See id at 2235-38 (reprinting City of Hialeah, Fla. Ordinance No. 87-40 (June 9,
1987); City of Hialeah, Fla. Ordinance 87-52 (Sept. 8, 1987); City of Hialeah, Fla. Ordi-
nance 87-71 (Sept. 22, 1987)).
26. See id at 2238 (reprinting City of Hialeah, Fla. Ordinance No. 87-72 (Sept. 22,
1987)).
27. See id. (reprinting City of Hialeah, Fla. Ordinance No. 87-72 (Sept. 22, 1987)).
28. See id. at 2230.
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terest standard. The trial judge found four compelling interests: sacrifice
was bad for the animals, it was bad for children, it was unsanitary, and it
interfered with zoning.29 The compelling interest test has become much
watered down in recent times.
I agreed to do the appeal, and then Smith came down. I thought the
case was hopeless, but then I looked at the ordinances and, seeing how
they were drafted, decided that Lukumi should be argued in the Supreme
Court as a discrimination case.
The Supreme Court does not get many such cases. Indeed, the first
paragraph of the opinion talks about the "fundamental nonpersecution
principle" that the Court rarely has occasion to enforce.30 That's Justice
Kennedy speaking. We had presented the case that way. Here was one
of the few cases the Supreme Court had ever seen where government set
out to suppress a single religion. The Court struck down these ordi-
nances 9-0, but without casting the slightest doubt on Smith. There
seemed clearly to be six votes for Smith in the Lukumi opinions. Black-
mun and O'Connor adhered to their separate opinions in Smith,3" and
Justice Souter wrote a long, scholarly opinion in which he set out the
choice between an equal-treatment model of religious liberty and a no-
substantive-interference model of religious liberty. He said that issue re-
mained open, that Smith didn't settle it, and, in an appropriate case, the
Court should reconsider Smith.32
Those are the recent Supreme Court cases. It seems to me that those
cases suggest a real crisis. The worst result was avoided in all three of
them, but in all three of them we had, in a land that was supposed to
have been founded for religious liberty, a worship service central to a
minority faith at the very brink of suppression. The worship service was
made criminally illegal in two of the cases, and the minority faith was
faced with losing all its facilities for worship in the third case.
B. Other Regulation of Churches
More generally, even mainstream churches are having lots of conflicts
with government regulation. These conflicts are sometimes over faith
matters, but more commonly they are over institutional matters, where
the government tends to see no religious liberty issue at all.
One such case is Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of
California,33 which didn't get nearly as much press as Smith. But in
some ways, Swaggart is just as important. The holding in Swaggart is
29. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp.
1467, 1485-86 (S.D. Fla. 1989), affd, 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct.
2217 (1993).
30. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217,
2222 (1993).
31. See id. at 2250-52 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
32. See id. at 2240-50 (Souter, J., concurring).
33. 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
[Vol. 62
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION
that there is no constitutional right to religious tax exemption.3 The tax
exemption of church property, in effect in every state, is now a matter of
legislative grace. Tax exemption is probably not in much danger, at least
with respect to core church property; it probably is in danger with re-
spect to collateral property like retreat houses, summer camps, and the
like.
Part of the reasoning of Swaggart was that economic burdens and reg-
ulation of the church raise no free-exercise issue unless they require the
church to violate a specific doctrinal tenet. Swaggart did not think it was
a sin to pay the taxes, so there was no free-exercise problem. This is a
thoroughly secular view of religion-it views God as the great school-
marm who lays down certain rules, and it defines religion as obeying
those rules. There are ministers who present religion in this way, and
there are people who experienced religion in this way and who conse-
quently left their church, and who retain the image of religion as simply
a set of rules to be obeyed. Obeying the rules is an aspect of religion, and
in some faiths obeying a set of rules is one of the central aspects of the
religion. But most people who stayed in their religion see a lot more than
simply obeying rules. They see positive benefits; they see a community of
which they are a part that is doing a lot of things, only some of which are
obeying the rules.
Jesse Choper has offered what may be the extreme form of this notion
that you don't have a claim unless you are obeying God's rules: do you
fear extra-temporal consequences? If you're going to hell for it, it's a
religion. Other than that, we're not sure it's covered by the free exercise
clause.35
This definition of religion has astonishing consequences that the
Supreme Court has not explored. Let me tell you about some lower
court cases and some cases that didn't make it to court at all.
There are lots of things that are obviously religious that are not re-
quired. The Second Circuit told some high schoolers they didn't have a
free exercise claim about their right to pray, because they weren't Mus-
lims. Muslims are required to pray at a certain time every day and that
might fall during school hours, but Christians don't have that problem.
Prayer isn't mandatory for Christians and so it isn't a free-exercise issue,
according to the court.3 6
The Supreme Court of Washington said that becoming a minister is
not free exercise of religion because no one is required to do that.37 I'm
34. See id at 378.
35. See Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment. 1982 U. I11. L.
Rev. 579, 601-04.
36. See Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1123 (1981).
37. See Witters v. State of Washington Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1123
(Wash.) (en bane), cert denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989).
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not making this up. They did say it in a context where there was a coun-
tervailing establishment clause issue.
The Boston Landmarks Commission argued that it could tell Jesuits
where to put the altar in their chapel in Boston, because there was no
doctrinal tenet that said the altar had to be in one place or another.3 8
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts avoided Smith and Swaggart on
that one, protecting the Jesuits by turning to the state constitution, which
is a sensible place to turn if you are a defendant in one of these cases.
Mother Teresa's shelter for the homeless here in New York was shut
down without any litigation because, after Swaggart and Smith, Mother
Teresa clearly didn't have a defense. 9 The shelter was shut down be-
cause it didn't have an elevator and it was on the second floor, and the
authorities said there was no access for the handicapped homeless. The
nuns said that if they got handicapped homeless, they would carry them
up the stairs. The authorities said that was unacceptable. "This isn't
India, this is America, and carrying people up the stairs is inconsistent
with American notions of human dignity." Better they should sleep in
the streets apparently. That's my nominee for the most frivolous com-
pelling interest ever asserted. But, after Smith, no compelling interest is
required.
There are a very large number of church zoning cases.4" It is almost
impossible for a church to claim that it's a tenet of the faith that the
church or any of its functions must be in any particular place. So, under
Swaggart, none of those churches has a claim.
One of the post-Smith cases that got litigated and reported is Corner-
stone Bible Church v. City of Hastings.4' The case reveals much about
the equality model of religious liberty. Cornerstone appears to have been
a small, non-denominational, evangelical Protestant, entrepreneurial-
minister-type church. It rented space in a downtown storefront-dis-
turbing no one, so far as we can tell from the opinions-for three years.
Then someone discovered that it was operating in violation of the zoning
laws. In Hastings, Minnesota, unlike most other towns in America,
churches could not be in a commercial zone. There is lots of litigation
over laws prohibiting churches in residential zones, but Hastings said
they could not be in a commercial zone. The church said that there was
no other space in town that it could afford and that was on the market.
Telling Cornerstone that it could not be in a commercial zone was the
38. See Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571, 573 (Mass.
1990).
39. See Sam Roberts, Fight City Hall? Nope, Not Even Mother Teresa, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 17, 1990, at B1.
40. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 48-
50; Laurie Reynolds, Zoning the Church: The Police Power Versus the First Amendment,
64 B.U. L. Rev. 767 (1984); Marc D. Stem, God's Shrinking Little Acre: Zoning and
Religious Institutions, 4 Seton Hall Const. L.J. (forthcoming 1994).




same as kicking it out of town. The city said, "tough"-or maybe
"good"-it's not clear which.
The trial judge found a case that he thought was squarely on point that
said the inability to afford property with the necessary zoning was irrele-
vant to a First Amendment challenge to the zoning law. If the First
Amendment plaintiff could not compete economically in the real estate
market, that was plaintiff's problem, not the zoning authority's problem.
The case was City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Ina," about the First
Amendment zoning rights of pornographic movie theaters. Again, it is
the logic of equal treatment. Churches and pornographic movie theaters
are both engaged in First Amendment activities. They have different
political valences, and pornography gets only limited constitutional pro-
tection because it is thought to be speech of low value,43 but porno-
graphic zoning cases provide a comparison point for applying the equal
treatment view of the free exercise clause.
The court of appeals reversed on the theory that, although the church
had been treated as well as pornographic movie theaters, it had been
treated less favorably than the Masonic Lodge." And the church and
the Masonic Lodge were both not-for-profit organizations.45 So again,
you have to find some sort of discrimination to prevail in one of these
cases.
IV. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION AcT
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act46 is a response to these theo-
retical and practical problems. It is an effort to enact the theory that the
free exercise of religion is a substantive civil liberty, that the religious
minorities among us get to practice their faith and not merely to think
about it or to believe in it. It is an attempt to create a statutory right to
the free exercise of religion, pursuant to Congress' power under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
and therefore presumably to enforce all the rights incorporated in the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Act was first proposed shortly after Smith itself. The bill was
supported by a wall-to-wall coalition of religious and civil liberties
42. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
43. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality
opinion) ("[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the
total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it is manifest
that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and
lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate .... "). Renton rests
on the holding of Young, and applies Young much more restrictively than Young itself,
but it does not explicitly repeat the plurality's reasoning about the low value of
pornography.
44. See Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 471 (8th Cir.
1991).
45. See id.
46. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
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groups, including the ACLU, People for the American Way, the Na-
tional Council of Churches, major Jewish organizations, the National
Association of Evangelicals, the Mormons, and some conservative reli-
gious groups of which most of you have never heard. The President said
at the signing ceremony that only divine intervention could explain this
coalition.47
The one important group outside the coalition was the Catholic Bish-
ops, who opposed the bill for two years because they feared it would
somehow create a religious right to abortion. After the Supreme Court's
Casey48 decision continued constitutional protection for abortion, the
stakes got a lot lower, and a solution was eventually negotiated. The
stakes had been a lot higher when everyone thought that Roe v. Wade49
was going to be overruled. So the abortion issue was finally worked out,
and then all the major religious groups in the country were supporting
this bill.
At that point the prison authorities demanded that prisons be excluded
from the bill. They could not have religious liberty in the prisons be-
cause prisoners would make up phoney religions demanding steak and
champagne for dinner and guns and knives for their services. Janet Reno
asked Senator Kennedy for two weeks to study this issue, and to her
great credit, she came back and said that no exemption was necessary.
She said that the compelling interest test would take care of any legiti-
mate security and safety issues, and she stared down the Federal Bureau
of Prisons.
But a number of state attorneys general, on behalf of state prison war-
dens, brought immense pressure on their senators. Under the Senate
rules, one or two senators can hold up a bill indefinitely, and the bill was
on hold for about three months. The bill had passed the House unani-
mously; it had been recommended out of the Senate Judiciary Committee
15-l." It had fifty-seven co-sponsors in the Senate; the President was
saying he wanted the bill on his desk so he could sign it, but the bill
couldn't get to the floor for a vote.
The day I spoke at Fordham, the bill got to the floor. The prison
amendment was voted down 58-41; the main bill passed 97-3. The
House later accepted a minor Senate amendment, and the President
signed the bill on November 16, 1993.
We are now in a posture that is somewhat like the Voting Rights Act,
where the Supreme Court interpreted the constitutional protections
against race discrimination in voting very narrowly, and Congress re-
sponded with a statutory protection that was much broader. Here, the
47. See Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 17, 1993, at A18.
48. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
49. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).




Court adheres to the non-discrimination, formal-equal-treatment view of
religious liberty. Congress adheres to the view that religious liberty is a
substantive liberty and that no substantial burden should be placed on a
religious practice without a compelling interest. I assume that this con-
flict between the branches will encourage a constitutional challenge to
the Act. Some state government will say that RFRA is beyond Con-
gress' power. I think that that constitutional challenge should be and
will be rejected. Nearly every sitting Justice, including the most con-
servative ones, has written opinions acknowledging the constitutionality
of the Voting Rights Act, and I think the same theory applies here.
Smith and RFRA mean that most religious liberty litigation hence-
forth will be under the statute rather than under the Constitution, or
maybe under state constitutions rather than under federal law, but the
principal federal claim will be statutory. That means that if an unpopu-
lar religion prevails in court and Congress gets excited enough about it,
Congress can amend the statute to cut that religion out.
The vote on the prison amendment was some test, at least at the mo-
ment, of congressional willingness to enact RFRA across-the-board and
keep it across-the-board. I am less confident that the coalition that got
the bill enacted can be held together in the future with respect to particu-
lar amendments. If some strong secular interest group with lots of sup-
port on the Hill and some support among one sector of the religious
community comes in demanding an amendment, for example, to elimi-
nate the exemption for discrimination in employment in religious
schools, I don't know what might happen. Similarly, I don't know what
might happen with the landmark people, the zoning people, and all sorts
of folks who could come in and demand amendments at some time in the
future. I certainly hope that the coalition and the Congress will stand on
principle and resist amendments that would erode the Act. But for now,
we have a statutory guarantee of free exercise that is as broad in its terms
as the constitutional guarantee that the Court so dramatically narrowed
in Smith.
QUESTIONS & ANSwERS
QUESTION: When you argued the Lukumi case, did you make a con-
scious litigation strategy decision not to try to chip away at Smith because
you could win on equal treatment grounds?
MR. LAYCOCK: Basically yes. One of the things about the Supreme
Court is you get to have it both ways on the breadth of your argument.
There were five amicus briefs that did consciously chip away at Smith-
told them how wrong it was, told them what impact it had, gave them
five different ways to limit it or narrow it or trim it back without squarely
overruling it. The amici viewed it as an opportunity to educate the
justices.
But I made a deliberate decision not to breathe a hint that we wanted
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Smith overruled or that this was a stepping-stone to get it overruled.
One reason was that I don't think they would have granted certiorari to
consider that. The cert. petition presented the question as follows: this is
the first chance to tell us what Smith meant. What is a neutral and gen-
erally applicable law? That's the important new issue.
A second reason to limit the argument is that you get only fifty pages.
You can argue only so many things. There were four ordinances, there
were four alleged compelling interests. It was numbingly dull at times,
but we had to go through every one of them. If they found that any one
of the ordinances had a section that was neutral, that was enough to
suppress the practice; it didn't matter if we won on fifteen other issues,
we lost. Similarly, if they found that any one of the compelling interests
was really compelling, we would have lost. There was no space left to
tell them what was wrong with Smith. We left all that to the amici.
QUESTION: Were the lead and amicus briefs a concerted effort by the
people on your side, or was it just serendipitous?
MR. LAYCOCK: For the most part it was concerted. I think on
both sides there was a great deal of cooperation. We had five briefs,
twenty-some organizations all together. They had five briefs, seventeen
animal rights organizations. There was a major effort on our side not to
proliferate the number of briefs. We had what we called the "main-
stream brief," by Michael McConnell at Chicago and Ed Gaffney at Val-
paraiso. We tried to get all the mainstream churches and civil liberties
organizations united on that brief.
And then, there were other people with special concerns of their own
who, for whatever reason, wanted to say their own thing and didn't want
to join the main brief. The Catholic Bishops filed a brief in support of
neither side but saying Smith was bad. The Orthodox Jewish organiza-
tions, not surprisingly, filed a brief that said this is a real threat to kosher
slaughter, and besides that Smith is bad. The Rutherford Institute nearly
always files on its own; it prefers to maintain an independent voice. It's
not that they were uncooperative, but they were going to do their own
thing, and that was pretty clear from the beginning. The Council on
Freedom of Religion filed without consulting me in advance. I think the
experience on the other side was pretty similar.
QUESTION: I want to ask if this model of litigation in the Supreme
Court is an increasingly commonplace model, where there is a concerted
effort among various parties on both sides of the issue; and if that is an
increasingly common model, how does that reflect on the Supreme Court
as a neutral dispute resolution agency?
MR. LAYCOCK: I don't know that it's increasing. It is very com-
mon, and I think it has been common for a long time. In part, it is
simply people weighing in to let the Court know they care about the
issue. Sometimes, the amicus is free to say things that the party can't




We wanted a Muslim brief because Muslims sacrifice, but we couldn't
get one. I think we probably didn't have the personal ties to the Muslim
community to do it. We didn't know whom to approach, and the few
people we did approach didn't want Islam to be associated with what
they viewed as a less reputable religion. They thought they had enough
image problems of their own already. So we didn't get that brief.
It was very important to me to get some mainstream religious groups
simply to say that this was a legitimate religion. Santeria is not a bunch
of kooks who made something up last week, and I wanted someone be-
sides me to say that. A good deal of maneuvering went into making that
happen.
It's much easier to get these kinds of briefs in the Supreme Court than
it is in the court of appeals, because the organizations and the lawyers
who write them can only spread themselves so thin. How do you decide
which cases are important enough in the court of appeals? I wanted that
kind of legitimation in the court of appeals, and it was hard to get. The
liberal denominations had animal rights people on their staff or in their
pews that they were afraid to offend, and the conservative denominations
had people in their pews who thought this was satanism or idolatry. So it
was very hard to get amici on board.
The Christian Legal Society, the Baptist Joint Committee on Public
Affairs, and the Rutherford Institute were the three amici in the court of
appeals. Two of them said they wouldn't do it alone, that they needed
some other groups for political cover. The other side did not have that
problem, but I'm sure they had the same sort of coordination.
In the graduation prayer case, I did an amicus brief for the American
Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, the Anti-Defamation
League, the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council,
the National Council of Churches, the Baptist Joint Committee on Pub-
lic Affairs, the Stated Clerk of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), the
Seventh-Day Adventists, People for the American Way, and the New
York Committee on Public Education and Religious Liberty. It was the
same strategy, trying to get all the mainstream amici on a single brief.
But it was difficult at places to hold that range of groups on a single brief.
There were places where we had to write, "Some of these amici believe X
and some of these amici believe Y, but that's not at issue here. The only
thing at issue here is Z, and we're all agreed on Z." That kind of coordi-
nation goes on in most of the big cases that you read about and in some
of the smaller cases as well.
QUESTION: Will the Religious Freedom Restoration Act lead to fed-
eral regulations that enumerate protected religions?
MR. LAYCOCK: I hope not, and I don't think so. This is not a bill
that creates an agency or a bureaucracy for its operation. I don't think
there are going to be any regulations.
The principal enforcement mechanism is a private right of action with
attorneys' fees. Now, it applies to the federal agencies as well as the state
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and local governments. It may be that some of the federal agencies will
promulgate regulations about their own operations, setting out how they
deal with their responsibilities under the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act. That could happen.
But I certainly hope that no one undertakes to promulgate an official
list of religions. Such a list almost certainly would not get the right an-
swer, and as your question implies, such a list would raise problems of
establishment.
QUESTION: The rule announced in Smith is not a new rule. It just
reaffirmed the rule that was set out in Reynolds v. United States, ' the
polygamy case. I always thought that was a good rule because the citizenry
in general, I think, will treat religious citizens fairly well. Judges, on the
other hand, have shown considerable hostility to religious citizens-in their
distortion of the establishment clause, for example. The statute just passed
gives judges the last word as to what the law shall be, what burdens shall
be imposed on religious citizens. I don't know that that's a good thing.
MR. LAYCOCK: Well, that goes to the essence of the Madisonian
dilemma. Somebody has got to have the last word. It can't be the reli-
gious minority defining for itself how far its liberty goes.
QUESTION: It could be the legislature.
MR. LAYCOCK: It could be the legislature, but that just means the
majority would define for itself what minorities to tolerate. There would
be no right to religious liberty but only a policy goal of religious liberty.
And I think your reading of history and recent experience differs from
mine. The legislature hasn't been so good.
But the case for the statute, or for a judicially enforceable free exercise
clause, does not depend on an assessment of which branch is more pro-
tective. The important point is that cases do not get to the judges until
after the legislature has already rejected the religious claim. That is, if
the legislature leaves the religious practice unregulated or grants a reli-
gious exemption, then the judges don't get to second-guess that. The
Supreme Court is quite clear that exemptions do not violate the establish-
ment clause. They were unanimous on that in Amos v. Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints52
in 1987.
So, in effect, what the statute does is that it gives the religious minority
a second forum. If they can prevail in the legislature or if they can pre-
vail in the court, then they may get an exemption and be able to practice
their faith.
Some of these cases involve hostility; some of them simply involve in-
difference or ignorance. But there is a remarkable number of these cases
that comes up. And it is also important that it's not just the legislature
we're talking about. It's often some regulatory bureaucracy appointed to
51. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
52. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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implement a single group of statutes, and often committed to the goals of
an interest group that doesn't want to brook any exception.
QUESTION: I should have said that I think in the long run, liberal
democracy will treat religious citizens better more often than judges will.
MR. LAYCOCK: That may be. I certainly don't think judges are
heroes. Judges didn't do anything for the Mormons. They upheld laws
that abolished the church, confiscated its property, and deprived all
members of the right to vote. On the other hand, the judges saved the
Jehovah's Witnesses in the 1940s and 1950s from very hostile regula-
tion. 3 I think the second chance is worthwhile. But I don't necessarily
think that, on average, judges are better than legislators. I really don't
believe that. I think that what constitutional rights do is to give minority
groups a second forum.
QUESTION: How far can the Supreme Court go taking the teeth out
of the Act by just watering down the compelling state interest test to a point
where it's so narrow that it doesn't really mean anything?
MR. LAYCOCK: I think that's the principal danger to the bill. The
Supreme Court has been very inconsistent on what it means by compel-
ling state interest. There is no government bureaucrat in America who
doesn't believe that his program serves a compelling interest in every ap-
plication. I think the animal sacrifice case is a clear example of how
weak the compelling interest test can become in the hands of a judge who
doesn't want to grant the claim.
The trial judge in Miami equated compelling interest with a rational
basis. He said that protecting animals is a compelling interest because it
has long been held to be a legitimate interest, citing two cases that it was
within the scope of police power to protect animals.' If you asked him
whether he realized he had just said that compelling interest and rational
basis are the same thing, I think he would have said he didn't realize he
had done that. But that is exactly what he had done.
Most federal judges right now are inclined to be highly deferential to
the legislature. There was some fear in the Senate that judges were going
to run amok and protect all sorts of crazy stuff. I think the greater risk is
that they will be highly deferential and not protect nearly enough.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court's opinions on what the compel-
ling state interest test means in the context of free exercise are really
quite protective. There were a lot of cases that carved out exceptions
before Smith, cases where the Court did not apply the compelling interest
test.5 5 But when they apply it, they're pretty stout about it. Wisconsin v.
53. The cases from these two experiences are collected in Douglas Laycock. A Survey
of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 Ohio St. L.J. 409, 416-20 (1986).
54. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hiadleah, 723 F. Supp.
1467, 1486 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (citing Humane Society of Rochester v. Lyng, 633 F. Supp.
480, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) and C.E. America, Inc. v. Antinori, 210 So.2d 443, 444 (Fla.
1968)), affid, 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991), rey'd, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
55. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n. 485 U.S. 439,
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Yoder56 is the most important and most famous case, where they said
that the last two years of compulsory education, which certainly sounds
important, wasn't compelling enough in the context of the Amish. All
the unemployment compensation cases say that saving money isn't com-
pelling enough.57 All those cases say that speculative fears don't count;
you've got to have real evidence that bad things are about to happen.
A couple of times in the past two years, in Lukumi58 and in some
speech cases,5 9 they've said compelling really means what it says and that
it is a "rare case" where the compelling interest test is satisfied. On the
other hand, when they want to uphold something, compelling doesn't
mean what it says, and lots of interests are important enough. So I think
you put your finger on the main line of litigation over the next few years.
My own view, which I offered to the Court in Lukumi without picking
up any response, is that the compelling interest test is an implied excep-
tion to the constitutional text.6° As Justice Black always told us, the text
is indeed absolute. We can't live with absolute protection; we know that.
But the exception is implied by necessity, and that tells you something
about what the exception means-that it ought to be limited to cases of
clear necessity. I think this is the only way to make sense of what the
compelling interest test does in constitutional doctrine. But the Supreme
Court has never committed to any theory of the compelling interest test
in the past, and I suspect that it never will.
QUESTION: I suspect they will be resistant to applying a compelling
state interest test because in Smith they denied that they ever applied it, I
believe.
MR. LAYCOCK: Justice Scalia had only five votes. He apparently
believed he couldn't overrule anything, and so he didn't. He distin-
guished everything away instead. He said that some of the cases turned
on hybrid rights of free exercise and something else. At one point he said
the Court had "purported" to apply the compelling interest test, but ex-
cept for Yoder and the unemployment cases, he said the Court had never
actually done it. He said that what the Court purported to call the com-
450-53 (1988) (use of government property); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342,
349-53 (1987) (prisons); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986) (internal govern-
ment operations); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (military).
56. 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972).
57. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 831-33 (1989);
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144-46 (1987); Thomas v.
Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-09
(1963).
58. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2233
(1993).
59. See Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1857 (1992).
60. This view is elaborated in Douglas Laycock, Notes on the Role of Judicial Review,
the Expansion of Federal Power, and the Structure of Constitutional Rights, 99 Yale L.J.
1711, 1744-45 (1990) (reviewing Robert F. Nagel, Constitutional Cultures: The Mental-
ity and Consequences of Judicial Review (1989)).
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pelling interest test was really something less. That's one way of putting
the cases together.
That is a type of opinion that Scalia likes to write. It's not limited to
this context. He has done the same thing in civil procedure cases. He
says that they "purport" to say that due process depends on a balancing
test, but that in fact they uphold anything that comes before them, and
that they should admit they will uphold anything that comes before
them. He says that service of process on somebody who is just passing
through the airport is constitutional because it's traditional, not because
it makes sense.6 He wrote that same opinion in two punitive damages
cases, TXO 62 and Pacific Mutual v. Haslip.63 He said the Court claims
that due process imposes a limit on traditional procedure, but that the
Court never strikes anything down, and it would be better to admit that.
There is a running debate between Justice Scalia, who says that none
of the Court's tests mean what they say, and really anything goes, and
Justice O'Connor, who says it's very important to maintain the test, but
when she applies it, then anything goes, except in the punitive damages
context.
QUESTION: Do you know who the three Senators were who voted
against the Religious Freedom Restoration Act?
MR. LAYCOCK: I was told one was Jesse Helms, who had been
helping to lead the charge on the prison amendment; one was Matthews
from Tennessee; and one was Byrd from West Virginia; but I don't know
why.
QUESTION: With respect to this interpretation of the free exercise
clause as just guaranteeing facial neutrality, it seems to me that any
claims under that can be taken care of under the equal protection clause.
I mean, what's left of the free exercise clause under that view? My second
question is, as between that view and the substantive-right view, which is
prevailing in the academic circles?
MR. LAYCOCK: I think you're right. Nothing is left for free exer-
cise under the equal-protection view. The free exercise clause just tells
you that religion is special for equal-protection purposes, in the same way
we know that race is special for equal-protection purposes. So you get a
compelling interest standard for discrimination, instead of merely a ra-
tional basis standard for discrimination. I guess free exercise is just that.
But this interpretation really does just make it an adjunct of the equal
protection clause.
As to which view is prevailing, I don't know how much academic cir-
cles matter. The substantive theory just prevailed this morning in Con-
61. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 623-25 (1990) (plurality opinion).
62. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2727 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring).




gress, and the equality theory is prevailing in the courts, and that has
become an interbranch separation-of-powers problem.
Academically, I think that the substantive-protection view greatly pre-
dominates. But if you simply read the published articles, the debate ap-
pears much more balanced. Good scholars have written strong articles
supporting the basic standard in Smith, although not the opinion.6' I
think there are more articles criticizing it 65 than defending it, but the
imbalance is not great.
On the other hand, there were fifty-five constitutional law professors
who signed a petition for rehearing in Smith, and those signatures were
gathered in a matter of days. So I think the general opinion among con-
stitutional law professors is more lopsidedly against Smith than the pub-
lished literature, but I don't know that for sure.
QUESTION: Under the new statute, does the statute as a whole have to
serve a compelling interest, or does the government have to have a compel-
ling reason for refusing an exemption from the statute? And what is a
substantial burden on religion under the statute?
MR. LAYCOCK: The state has to have a compelling interest in im-
posing the burden on the individual's religion. An exemption would
avoid imposing a burden, so we are focused only on the interest in deny-
ing exemptions.
Part of the problem legislatively was that no one could draft any new
language. You had to do the whole thing in terms of familiar formulas,
to hold the coalition together. That broad-based a coalition couldn't
agree on new language. So it doesn't say some things as explicitly as I
would like it to. It does not explicitly say anything about the Swaggart
standard. The Committee report and the floor debate keep offering zon-
ing cases as an example, which is evidence that Congress' conception of
burden is also broader than the Supreme Court's conception of burden in
Swaggart, but neither the statute nor the legislative history ever says that
explicitly.
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